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Abstract
Availability and reliability considerations are discussed in this 
paper with special focus on ‘cloud based’ Mobile Switching 
and Telecommunication Application Servers (MSS and TAS). 
Before the extensive deployment of cloud based telecommu-
nication networks, the essential question shall be answered: 
Will cloud technology ensure the ‘carrier grade’ requirements 
that are well established and proven on ‘legacy telecommuni-
cations’ hardware? This paper shows the possible redundancy 
principles and a simulation method to predict availability for 
‘cloudified’ mobile communication network elements. As a cal-
culation example, Nokia AS on ‘telco-cloud’ is presented, that 
combines several redundancy principles such as full protection 
(2N), standby and load sharing.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the accelerating demand for quicker launch of 
new mobile services as well as the continuous increase of both 
the number of subscribers and their traffic turned the interest 
towards Cloud technology. On one hand, information technol-
ogy (IT) introduces standardized hardware (HW) scenario for 
the telecommunication applications. On the other hand, ‘telco-
cloud’ offers possibilities for more flexible and economic 
resource allocations, e.g. scaling (Fig. 1). These benefits are 
widely investigated recently [1-3].
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Fig. 1 ‘Cloudification’ of telecommunication network elements
In a typical mobile network operator’s (MNO) landscape [4] 
there is a wide variety of Network Elements (NE) based on 
different vendor specific hardware and software (SW) compo-
nents as shown in Fig. 2. They are required to fulfill the various 
subscriber services [4]. Frequent introduction of new services 
as well as network (NW) maintenance e.g. performing SW 
upgrades or capacity expansions require careful preparation, 
planning and application specific HW.
In telecommunications networks the very strict service avail-
ability requirements are usually referred to as ‘five nines’ or 
A=99.999% availability. In practice, ‘five nines’ means maxi-
mum 316 seconds unplanned NE downtime in a year. Similarly, 
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‘six nines’ means maximum 32 seconds of outage over a year. 
Telecommunication HW (and SW) is specially designed to sup-
port these very strict requirements. On the other hand, IT HW 
components -even that of high quality- are not specially designed 
for telecom applications. Operators’ target is to achieve at least 
as good capacity, performance and availability on the Cloud as it 
is provided nowadays on traditional, legacy or proprietary HW.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 summa-
rizes availability and reliability definitions with special focus 
on their application in telecommunication networks. In Part 
3 the basic redundancy principles and their calculations are 
shown. Part 4 discusses availability on network level. Finally, 
in Part 5 a calculation example is shown. The simulation results 
show that availability of cloud based telecommunication net-
work elements can reach that of legacy ones deployed on tradi-
tional telecommunication HW.
2 Availability and Reliability definitions
Availability definitions and their explanations are summa-
rized in this chapter. Please note that for some of the terms 
alternative definitions exist in the literature.
Availability predictions are mathematical calculations and 
models made for the different Network Elements to predict their 
availability performance. Predictions indicate the expected 
field performance only approximately. Prediction methods are 
useful when field data is not yet existing or very scarce. This is 
typically the case in the design phase of new products or when 
a new technology is introduced.
Availability targets in telecommunication networks are 
usually given in terms of “nines” as summarized in Table 1. 
Different levels of availability shall be distinguished:
• component level,
• Unit level,
• Network Element (NE) level,
• interconnection (e.g. IP backbone),
• Network (NW) level and
• service level availability.
Table 1 Availability percentages and corresponding yearly 
Mean Down Time (MDT) values
“nines”
A yearly
% MDT unit
“2 nines” 99.0 3.65 days
“3 nines” 99.9 8.76 hours
“4 nines” 99.99 52.56 min
“5 nines” 99.999 5.26 min
“6 nines” 99.9999 31.54 sec
Units are composed of components (combination of HW 
components and SW building blocks). Due to the strict avail-
ability requirements, troubleshooting cannot go down to com-
ponent level. In case of fault, the entire unit is replaced as soon 
as possible, to minimize any possible outage time.
NEs are composed of units. NWs are composed of NEs and 
their interconnections. Service level availability has a wider 
sense than NW availability. Service should be granted to the 
subscribers in an end-to-end (e2e) manner when and where 
they would like to benefit the provided services.
A NW may operate with excellent availability, however 
where a geographical region is not covered, there the service 
Fig. 2 Core Network Elements (e.g. TAS and MSS) in a mobile network
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is not available. Another example is the interconnection of 
networks. E.g. when the subscriber’s home NW is completely 
available but the visited network has an outage, then the sub-
scriber cannot roam. On the contrary, when subscribers can 
make 2G or 3G calls, then they are not so sensitive for the lack 
or outage of 4G services in case of simple voice calls.
The very strict availability target required for telecommu-
nication NEs is typically 5 or 6 nines, which is often approxi-
mated by (1).
A
MTBF
MTBF MTTR
≅
+
Please note that in a well designed system, the outage of a 
unit does not automatically result in the outage or in the avail-
ability degradation of the entire network element. Similarly, the 
outage of a network element shall not automatically result in 
any availability degradation of the entire network.
On the contrary, proper NE and NW designs shall tolerate 
planned maintenance breaks. Planned maintenance breaks are 
used e.g. to check regularly, maintain or replace field replace-
able units (FRU). Regular SW updates and upgrades are also 
preferably scheduled into planned maintenance windows.
Estimation is used instead of availability prediction when 
sufficient field data exists. Estimations correspond to actual 
measurement of failures. Estimated Mean Time Between 
Failures (MTBF) can be calculated based on the observation 
of similar NEs, usually after several field deployments. The 
longer time period is used for the observation and the larger 
population of similar NEs is observed the more accurate MTBF 
estimation can be reached.
 Time
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Fig. 3 Typical failure rate curve over lifetime
Failure and Fault: A failure means any non-intended devi-
ation of the system’s behavior, defect or malfunction of HW 
and SW maintained. Fault may result in the loss of operational 
capabilities of the network element or the loss of redundancy in 
case of a redundant configuration.
Failure Rate: Failure Rate (λ) represents the number of fail-
ures likely to occur over a period of time. The failure rate of 
units (assembled from large number of components) is constant 
over the life expectancy. The constant failure rate period falls 
between the initial ‘infant mortality” and the final “wear out” 
phases of the lifetime. Figure 3 shows the well-known “bath-
tub” curve [5-7,14].
FPMH and FIT: Failure Rate is defined in units of Failures 
per Million Hours (FPMH) or failures per billion hours (FITs). 
If a unit has a failure rate of 1 FPMH, that unit is likely to fail 
once in one million hours. The failure rate is often measured 
in FITs (2):
FIT =
number of failures
h10
9
MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is the expec-
tation of the operating time duration between two consecutive 
failures of a repairable item. For field data MTBF is calculated 
as the total operating lifetime divided by the number of fail-
ures. MTBF is measured in hours or years. The following rela-
tionships apply between failure rate and MTBF:
MTBF(hours) =
1
λ
MTBF(years) =
MTBF(hours)
24 365
1
8760⋅
=
⋅λ
MTTF: Mean Time to Failure is the mean proper operation 
time until the first failure (Fig. 4). Mainly used for the charac-
terization of non-repairable or non-replaceable items, MTTF is 
a basic measure of reliability. As a statistical value, MTTF shall 
be preferably measured over a long period of time and with a 
large number of units.
 
MDT
MTBF
MUT
MTTF
system operatessystem fails
time
failure
MDT
Fig. 4 MTBF, MTTF, MDT and MUT on time scale
MDT: Mean Down Time (MDT) is the expectation of the 
time interval during which a unit or NE is in down state and 
cannot perform its function. MDT is the average time that a 
system is non-operational (Fig. 4). MDT includes all downtime 
associated with repair, corrective and preventive maintenance, 
self-imposed downtime, and any logistics or administrative 
delays. Please note that the down time of an individual unit 
(or more units) does not automatically result in down time of 
the entire NE element. Similarly, the down time of a single NE 
does not result in automatically a down time of the entire NW.
The addition of logistic delay times distinguishes MDT from 
MTTR, which includes only downtime specifically attributable 
to repairs. In order to minimize MDT, operators shall have 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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proper HW spare part management. In practice it means spare 
items of the different replaceable HW units stored in ware-
house (in the amount according to the needs on NW level and 
calculated statistically). To reduce MDT, travel to the sites shall 
be also minimized. In practice this requires the possibility of 
remote NE access and remote SW management.
MUT: Mean Up Time is defined as the continuous opera-
tional time of the NE or the system without any down time 
(Fig. 4) [5]. MUT can be approximated with MTBF when 
MTTR is in the order of a few hours only and MTTF is in 
the order of several thousand hours. It is straightforward that 
system availability can be defined as MUT divided by the total 
operational time, the sum of MUT and MDT (5):
A
MUT
MUT MDT
=
+
MTTR: Mean Time to Repair (also known as Mean Time to 
Recovery) is the expectation of the time interval during which 
a unit or NE is down due to a failure that is under reparation. 
MTTR represents the average time required to repair a failed 
component or device. As seen in (1) MTTR affects availabil-
ity. If it takes a long time to recover a system from a failure, 
the system will have a low availability. High availability can 
be achieved only if MTBF is very large compared to MTTR:
MTBF MTTR
The time that service persons take to acquire parts or mod-
ules, test equipment, and travel to the site is sometimes included 
in MTTR, but sometimes counted separately. MTTR generally 
does not include lead time for parts not readily available or 
other administrative and logistic downtimes. In our defini-
tion logistic delays shall be excluded from MTTR in order to 
achieve the required high availability.
Reliability Block Diagram: The Reliability Block Diagram 
(RBD) allows the graphical representation how the compo-
nents of a system are reliability-wise connected. In most cases 
within a system, independence can be assumed across the com-
ponents. Meaning, the failure of component A does not directly 
affect the failure of component B. Please note that the RBD 
shall not be equivalent or similar to the physical or logical 
setup or block diagram of the system.
It is worth to mention, that some parts of the full system 
are often omitted in the RBD. The parts that do not belong to 
the “functional” or “mission critical” ones of the system shall 
not be calculated in the availability figures. These parts can be 
for example displaying, statistical, logging or reporting sub-
systems, functions or units that help operators to supervise the 
entire system. Even though, the outages of these functions or 
units are inconvenient, they do not deteriorate the main func-
tion of the system it is designed for.
Unavailability is the complement of availability (7)-(9). It 
is the probability that the unit or NE cannot perform its function 
even though the required resources and normal operating con-
ditions are provided.
U A= −1
U
MUT
MUT MDT
MDT
MUT MDT
= −
+
=
+
1
U
MTBF
MTBF MTTR
MTTR
MTBF MTTR
≅ −
+
=
+
1
3 Availability and redundancy principles
A system composed of functional units in chain becomes 
unavailable, if any of the chained units fail (Fig. 5). Non-func-
tional units are not considered as part of the chain, due to that 
fact that the unavailability of any non-functional unit does not 
deteriorate the desired function of the entire system. Thus the 
availability of end users’ services is not affected.
 
 
Fig. 5 System MTBF of two units in series
Resulting availability (10), unavailability (11), system 
failure rate λS (12) and MTBFS (13) of two units in series are 
written as:
A =A A = U U
S U1 U2 U1 U2
⋅ −( ) ⋅ −( )1 1
U =U U U U
S U1 U2 U1 U2
+ − ⋅
λ λ λ
S U1 U2
= +
MTBF
MTBF MTBF
MTBF MTBF
S
S U1 U2
U1 U2
U1 U2
= =
+
=
⋅
+
1 1
λ λ λ
In case of two identical units in the chain the availability, 
unavailability, failure rate  λS  and  MTBFS  are simplified to:
A A A = A
S U1 U2 U1=U2=U U
= ⋅ 2
U U +U U U = 2U U
S U1 U2 U1 U2 U1=U2=U U U
= − ⋅ − 2
λ λ λ λ
S U1 U2 U1=U2=U U
= 2= +
MTBF
MTBF
S
S U
U= = =
1 1
2λ 2λ
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(16)
(15)
(17)
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The system composed of several units in a chain becomes 
unavailable if any of the units (or any combination of two or 
more units) fails.
MTBFU2MTBFU1
MTBFS
MTBFU3 MTBFUn. . .
 
Fig. 6 Availability calculation and its model for  n  serial units
System failure rate λS (18) and system MTBFS (19) for  n 
units in chain (Fig. 6) are written as:
λ λ λ λ λ λ
S U1 U2 U3 Un Ui
i=1
n
= + + + + =∑
MTBF
S
Uii=1
n
S
= =
∑
1 1
λ λ
Supposing that all the n units are identical in the chain, the 
system failure rate λS (18) and system MTBFS (19) formulas 
are simplified to:
λ = λ λ λ λ
U1 U2 U3 Un U
= = = =
λ λ
S U
n= ⋅
MTBF
n
MTBF
n
S
S U
U= =
⋅
=
1 1
λ λ
As it is seen in (22), the longer the chain composed of iden-
tical units is, the smaller the system MTBFS  is. The system 
availability  AS  of  n  units forming a chain is:
A A A A A
S U1 U2 U3 Un
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Equation (23) shows the well-known fact that the less avail-
able unit within the chain determines the overall system avail-
ability. In case of n identical units (23) simplifies to:
A A A A A = A
S U1 U2 U3 Un U1=U2= =Un=U U
n= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅… 
Similarly to (7) the system unavailability is:
U A A
S S U
n= − = −1 1
The system unavailability US of the entire chain can be 
approximated as the sum of the units’ unavailability figures 
(upper bound). Equation (26) is valid in case of highly avail-
able units working in the chain (e.g. A=99.9% or better), where 
the products of the corresponding very small unavailability fig-
ures are falling into negligible orders of magnitude (e.g. UUi∙UUj 
= 0.1%∙0.1% = 0.001∙0.001 ≈ 0):
U U + U + U U U U
U
S U1 U2 U3 Un U1 U2
Uii=1
n
= + + − ⋅ −
≤ ∑
 
Parallel protection of units significantly increases the avail-
ability of the network element (Fig. 7). It is very unlikely that 
both units fail the same time. Naturally, it is assumed that the 
failed unit is repaired or replaced as soon as possible to restore 
the back-up [6, 7].
Availability AP  (27) and unavailability UP  (28) of two units 
operating in parallel (supposing ideal switching between them 
in case of failure) is written as:
A A +A A A
P U1 U2 U1 U2
= − ⋅
U U U = U
P U1 U2 U1=U2=U U
= ⋅ 2
λ λ λ
P U1 U2 U1 U2
MTTR MTTR= ⋅ ⋅ +( )
MTBF
MTBF MTBF
MTTR MTTR
P
P
U1 U2
U1 U2
= =
⋅
+
1
λ
 
MTBFU2
MTBFU1
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Fig. 7 System MTBF of two units in parallel
The resulting availability for two uniform parallel units is:
A U A = A A
P U U U U
= − = − −( ) −( )1 1 1 22 2
A A A A
U U P U
< → − > → >1 2 1
As it is seen in Eqs. (31) and in (32), the combined avail-
ability AP of two parallel units is -in practice- always higher 
than the availability of the individual units. For two identical 
parallel units the system failure rate λP and system MTBFP 
Eqs. (29), (30) are simply written as (33), (34) [8-10]:
λ λ
P U U
MTTR= ⋅ ⋅2 2
MTBF
MTBF
2 MTTR
P
U
U
=
⋅
2
The reliability block diagram of a complex system can 
be assembled from the basic (serial and parallel) reliability 
building blocks.
Figure 8 shows n units operating in parallel. Redundancy 
method is either  N+X, where N working units are supported by 
X spare units or load sharing (LS).
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
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Fig. 8 n units in parallel
Notation m/n is also often used, where the simultaneous 
outage of m units (out of the total number of n units forming 
the system) leads to a failure. Table 2 summarizes the different 
redundancy methods discussed.
Table 2 Redundancy principles
Notation Explanation
N
N working units, no redundant unit, that means
no protection.
n
total number of units, including working (N) and spare (X) units. 
n=N+X
m
number of simultaneously failed units (that may lead to the 
system failure)
2N full redundancy of N working units and N (hot or cold) spare units
X number of spare units beside the working units
N+1
N working units + one (hot or cold standby) spare unit. Only 
one unit may fail from the N working ones and the spare takes 
over its role.
N+X N working units + X (hot or cold) spare units
SN+
Load Sharing mode without any redundant unit: in case of any 
unit outage the remaining units carry as much traffic as they can 
handle. The group of load sharing units shall have enough spare 
capacity to bear a unit failure.
RN
Load Sharing in Recovery Groups (RG). One RG consists of 
several Functional Units that are dedicated to the same function. 
FUs cannot be allocated on the same physical resource (blade) 
if they belong to the same RG. But similar FUs belonging to 
different RGs can share the same blade.
Pooling
Grouping of several similar servers to increase network level 
availability. Pooling supports planned outages, geo-redundancy, etc.
It is worth to mention that different combinations of the 
above protection methods are also possible. For example on 
Cloud, the HW blades may have N+1 protection while func-
tional units can have either 2N, N+1 or RN depending on the 
function they provide. Affinity rules may ensure that 2N pro-
tected FUs are allocated onto different physical blades.
Overall Mean Time Between Failures MTBFP of n parallel 
units can be calculated according to (35), where m denotes the 
number of failed units [10].
MTBF
MTBF
n!
n m m 1
MTTR
P m n
m
m
,
! !
=
−( ) −( )
⋅ −1
It is worth to mention that Eq. (35) in the simple case of m = 
n = 2 (full redundancy) gives back (34).
Figure 9 plots calculated MTBFP results as a function of n, 
the total number of units (sum of working and spare). Param-
eter of the curves is the increasing number of spare units (or 
NEs in a NW composed of parallel NEs).
 n=N+X
MTBF
(hours)
Fig. 9 N+X redundancy, n=N+X=1,…,10
Please note that in the above models the interconnection 
between the units (represented by arrows in Fig. 5-8) have been 
assumed to be ideal. In a real network, however, this is not 
true, even though in most of the cases interconnection can be 
neglected as it has higher reliability than that of the NEs. The 
interconnections bring their own contribution to the network 
level availability that is discussed in the following part.
4 Network level availability
In a multinode network with only one spare, the system can 
tolerate the outage of only one single NE (Fig. 10). Outage may 
happen due to either interconnection (IP backbone composed of 
switches, routers, cables, optical fibers, connectors etc.) or NE 
failure. The simultaneous failure of two (or more) nodes would 
seriously overload or take down the network. To increase the 
overall network availability ANW , sufficient amount of spares 
(NEs or units) shall be available.
Obviously, the higher the number n of the NEs is, the higher 
the number of the possible failures (36) is as it is discussed in 
[11].
U
n n 1
A
n n 1
U
NW NE NE
=
⋅ −( )
⋅ −( ) = ⋅ −( ) ⋅
2
1
2
2 2
(35)
(36)
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Fig. 10 Multiple NEs with one redundant NE
In a properly dimensioned and maintained network, the out-
age of one single NE shall not significantly decrease the overall 
network availability and thus the service availability (Fig. 11). 
This can be achieved with proper dimensioning of the server 
pool and the individual NE loads (Table 3).
Similarly, the bandwidth of the interconnections shall be 
planned with sufficient reserves [12]. All the paths remaining 
active after an outage situation shall be capable to tolerate the 
possible load increase due to the outage of any NE or its inter-
connection. Outages are either planned maintenance breaks or 
unplanned outages due to disaster situation (e.g. longer power 
supply outage, earthquake, flood etc.).
Table 3 Example of NE load values that tolerate any individual NE outage within the pool
NE (server) Weight Factor Load [%]
with one server out of use (fault or planned maintenance)
NE1 out NE2 out NE3 out NE4 out
NE1 100
100/250 out of use
0 %
100/(100+50+30) 100/(100+70+30) 100/(100+70+50)
= 40 % = 56 % = 50 % = 45 %
NE2 70
70/250 70/(70+50+30) out of use
0 %
70/(100+70+30) 70/(100+70+50)
= 28 % = 47 % = 35 % = 32 %
NE3 50
50/250 50/(70+50+30) 50/(100+50+30) out of use
0 %
50/(100+70+50)
= 20 % = 33 % = 28 % = 23 %
NE4 30
30/250 30/(70+50+30) 30/(100+50+30) 30/(100+70+30) out of use
0 %= 12 % = 20 % = 17 % = 15 %
total 250 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Fig. 11 Pooling concept of telecommunication application servers
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5 Calculation example and simulation results
Availability predictions were calculated using Windchill 
(Relex) tool [13]. The reliability block diagram (Fig. 12) 
contains all the (critical) functional units of the NE. All the 
critical cloud HW building blocks are 2N redundant (e.g. EoR, 
ToR, bay switches and power supply units, (Fig. 13)). Storage 
system employs RAID 10 [14-16]. Functional units are either 
2N or N+1 protected or using load sharing (e.g. signalling 
units) [17].
Affinity rules ensure that the virtual machines (VMs) of pro-
tected functional units are separated onto physically different 
HW blades. In this way, a single computer blade failure can-
not cause simultaneous outage of working and standby units 
(of the same function, unless they belong to different RGs). 
Non-functional units (e.g. statistical units) are not involved in 
the availability calculations due to the fact that these units do 
not have any influence on call (or service) handling. Naturally 
they are involved in the dimensioning and load calculations, 
as non- functional units also have their own physical resources 
such as VMs on the blades. Similarly to functional units, non-
functional units are also consuming CPU, memory and storage.
 
  Fig. 13 Modeling the fully redundant (2N) IP switches
Monte-Carlo method provided the simulation results shown 
in Fig. 14. In this example, the total downtime was 58 seconds 
(0.016145 hours over one year (8760 h) as displayed in the 
figure). The predicted availability of the NE on Cloud is almost 
‘six nines’. (The simulation tool displays the calculated values 
rounded up to six decimal digits.)
 
Fig. 14 Simulation results using Windchill [13] tool
 
  
 
 
  
Fig. 12 Reliability block diagram example of a Telecommunication Application Server
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6 Conclusions
Overall availability of telecommunication networks depends 
on NE, interconnection and NW level redundancy methods. 
Simulation results predict that ‘telco-grade’ availability can 
be achieved on cloud based core network elements (e.g. AS 
or MSS) of mobile networks. Critical HW and SW functional 
units shall be redundant. As we can see in Fig. 15-16, full pro-
tection and load sharing are more efficient than other methods, 
especially with increasing number of parallel nodes or units.
 
Fig. 15 System MTBFS hours up to 6 parallel units (example 
of MTBFU = 20 hours, MTTRU = 1 hour)
 Fig. 16 System availability up to 6 parallel units (example 
of MTBFU = 20 hours, MTTRU = 1 hour). Comparison of 
non-protected and different redundancy systems.
Obviously, full protection (2N) is the most powerful, but 2N 
redundancy has the biggest footprint. Furthermore the increas-
ing number of units results in increasing number of intercon-
nections that brings additional possible failures.
Therefore, 2N is recommended only for ‘mission critical’ 
items (e.g. the IP switches). Interconnections must avoid single 
point of failure (SPoF) already in design phase (both HW and 
SW). In case of multiple items (e.g. load balancers or signal-
ling units), load sharing gives an optimal trade-off because of 
its effectiveness and relatively smaller footprint (e.g. compared 
to the 2N). Furthermore, load sharing efficiently supports the 
dynamic scaling of the functions (functional units) on Cloud 
[3,18]. Pooling concept helps on NW level to overcome indi-
vidual NE outages.
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